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Declass Review by NIMA/DOD

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IAS - 100/70
18 June 1970
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research

SUBJECT: IAS Comment on SR IM 70-20, "The New Chinese Strategic
Missile Launch Site--An Initial Assessment,"

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[] June 1970 (TOP SECRET [])

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1. I found your recent Intelligence Memorandum on the Wu-chai site of value and generally consistent with the evidence as I know it. However, it is at odds with my understanding of the evidence in two respects which I think may be of some importance to the early recognition of future SSM deployment elsewhere in China. For this reason I want to flag these differences for you, however minor they may seem in relation to an assessment of the missile system and its capabilities.

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2. My people and I believe that access to the site at the time of the initial missile sighting and firings in late 1968-early 1969 may have been from Wu-chai Airfield North as well as by the long road from the main rail line near Ning-wu. Construction of the airfield, which began sometime after [], evidently proceeded in an unusual way during its first few months. When the field was first seen on [] the outlines and grading of runway, parking aprons and taxiways had all been completed. This procedure, which differs from the normal Chinese practice of completing and surfacing one segment of an airfield at a time, would have permitted the field to be used on a limited basis in []. Personnel and perhaps some equipment could thus have proceeded to the Wu-chai site via the new airfield and thence via road at this early time, whereas your IM puts initial utilization of the airfield some time in the future.

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
3. We also consider the evidence to show that the rail line being built along the valley near Wu-chai is not intended solely for the purpose of serving the site. Photography of [] shows that the line is being extended beyond the site support areas toward the town of Ko-lan, farther up the valley. [] the road-bed extended at least four miles past the SSM site, where the photographic frame ended. A suggestion of a rail-to-road transfer point in early stages of construction near the SSM site could be seen in the photography, but we could not be sure of this. Your IM did not mention this [] evidence.

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June 1970 (TOP SECRET)

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4. Our interpretation that Wu-chai Airfield North was probably serviceable on a limited basis in late 1968 was made available to OSR in an IAS memorandum on 3 April 1970 [redacted]. The evidence that the rail line is proceeding on beyond the area of the Wu-chai SSM Site was reported in the IAS Notes of 1 May 1970 [redacted]

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5. The effect of these findings, in my view, is to weaken slightly the link between the Wu-chai SSM Site and the rail line and to suggest that early access by air was important to the Chinese. Applying these considerations to future deployment and the search for it, I think that: (a) the hurry-up construction of an airfield should be among our list of clues, (b) we should emphasize new or greatly improved roads as indicators, and (c) we should not necessarily expect a rail spur to within a short distance of a deployed site. To my mind, the latter two points tend to raise somewhat the possibility that the strange facility at I-cho-mao is an SSM site, though of course there are other problems in its identification.

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6. Should you or your people wish to discuss these matters further, please contact [redacted] Chief, MSD/IAS on extension [redacted]

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HOWARD STOLTZ, JR.
Director
Imagery Analysis Service

Distribution:

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3 - SR/CF/S (Attn: [redacted])

4 - ExecDir/NPIC

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6 - ONE Staff (Attn: [redacted])

7 - MSD/IAS

8 - ODir/IAS

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11. JJH- Stoertz Luncheon

JJH had lunch with Stoertz on the Patio today. The following items were discussed:

a. Mission 1110 Coverage - JJH gave Stoertz a copy of the [] memo received yesterday on the targets missed on the first bucket of 1110.

b. China Search Procedures - Yesterday, [] briefed the IAS Production Board on the new IEG search procedures for China. This was discussed at the luncheon today. JJH also told Stoertz that on Monday he will be briefing [] on the Wuchai aftermath.

c. Weekend Readout - The arrangements for the weekend readout were discussed.

d. Light Table Contract - JJH told Stoertz of [] successful negotiation with [] for the development of the 1540 light table. He has been successful in saving overall contract money and accelerating the delivery of the tables.

[]
f. Army Policy Council Briefing

g. COINS

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Friday
12 June 1970

h. NPIC Senior School Nominees

i. NPIC Instructor at Offutt - We aren't sending one full-time.

j. Use of Soft Covers on Basic Briefs

k. Briefing of State Department Economists - []

l. Equal Opportunities & Use

m. OSR Report on Missile Identification Procedures